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FOREWORD
Senior Service Colleges (SSCs) impart three
things as they prepare mid-career officers and civilians for entry into senior levels of leadership: skills,
knowledge, and identity. The first two are givens in
education. They are easy to define, easy to build a
curriculum around, and easy to measure. However,
when one considers many of the challenges and crises
facing today’s senior leaders, they tend to fall in the
third area—the attitudes and dispositions of the leaders putting the skills and knowledge into practice. We
tend to treat identity development as a natural and
self-evident result of gaining such skills and knowledge, but it is not.
The military is one of several professions trying
to solve the same problem of incorporating identity development into their educational curricula.
While mentioned in the most recent Joint instruction,
Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP),
operationalizing identity into SSC curricula remains
unspecified. In this Letort Paper, Dr. Galvin presents
a thorough understanding of the problem of identity
development and offers solutions based on his current work in the U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC)
resident program.

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
THOMAS P. GALVIN is in his 5th year with the
School of Strategic Landpower and currently serves
as a Professor of Leadership Studies. He holds a Doctor of Education degree in human and organizational
learning from George Washington University, and
has research interests across the fields of individual
and organizational learning, leadership, and management. Dr. Galvin retired as a colonel after 29 years
of service in the U.S. Army, which included 10 years
of service in various commander’s action groups in
joint, service, and combined commands overseas. He
also holds master’s degrees in strategic studies from
the U.S. Army War College and artificial intelligence
from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California.

ix

SUMMARY
Army senior Professional Military Education
(PME) includes the Senior Service College (SSC) resident and distance programs along with fellowships at
universities and agencies within the United States and
abroad. SSCs are responsible for aiding in the transition of officers from the mid-level to the senior levels
of command, leadership, and management. As the
saying goes, “colonels run the Army.” The transition
is significant; in addition to scaling up the technical
expertise and know-how to get things done within
higher level commands and staff headquarters, senior
leaders also assume guardianship of the Army profession, which includes both greater personal and professional responsibilities, and greater scrutiny over their
actions and decisions by those inside and outside the
Service.
In addition to gaining skills and acquiring knowledge, moving from mid-career to senior leader requires a transition of one’s professional identity. The
transition involves the letting go of one’s mid-career
persona and adoption of a new persona, encapsulating values and dispositions expected of senior leaders
to be able to operate in, and cope with, the strategic
environment. It constitutes a personal journey from
one level of leadership to another, and results in one’s
ability to apply such skills and knowledge in future
situations. It is also not an optional journey, as the failure to adopt and internalize those higher-order values
and dispositions are directly linked to various destructive and unethical behaviors that the joint community
wishes to avoid.
Unfortunately, identity development gets short
shrift in PME in general and SSCs in particular. The

xi

inculcation of professional values, resiliency, and
critical and reflective thought are essential to properly
operationalizing the skills and knowledge learned in
SSCs; but these are all-around highly subjective, difficult to measure, and therefore difficult to develop
educational activities. New policies for officer and
civilian professional education include provisions
for developing leaders, such as the recent inclusion
of six Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs) in the 2015
E version of the Joint instruction, Officer Professional
Military Education Policy (OPMEP), but it remains unclear how to operationalize those goals in curriculum
development.
A 2014 initiative at the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC) offers a potential model. A presentation of
eight “role identities” as a descriptive tool to help SSC
students understand how their PME would be applied
in their future duties as senior leaders was included
early in the USAWC curriculum. Short narratives of
these role identities have helped orient students on the
transitions they are expected to undertake and how
they might cope with the strategic environment they
are about to enter. Through the role identity metaphor,
the goal was to situate the students in the positions
of current and past senior leaders, helping them better appreciate the decisions and activities those leaders undertook so as to ease their own transitions. The
initiative had some success, but it currently does not
satisfy the overall need for fully incorporating identity development into the program. The purpose of
this Letort Paper is to examine the overall challenges
associated with identity development and propose an
expansion of the USAWC initiative for broader application across SSCs.
This Letort Paper is organized as follows: First, it
defines several avoidable problems associated with
xii

the failure to properly develop identities among senior
leaders and presents the case for a greater inclusion of
identity development in SSCs. These include senior
leaders who: are passively compliant rather than communicating with courage or taking risks with decisive
action; fail to dissociate from mid-career attitudes and
behaviors that may be disadvantageous for making
well-informed decisions on highly complex matters;
incur undue stress and health problems; or, succumb
to ethical failure due to an inability to cope with the
added responsibilities of senior leadership.
Second, various identity-related ideas and models are discussed from educational literature, as other
professions have wrestled with similar challenges.
From this emerges the construct of the role identity as
a viable choice for expressing the attitudes and dispositions desired in the context of the SSC students’ future requirements as senior leaders. The role identity
is a metaphor that situates the students in the shoes
of senior leaders, looking at challenges and decisions
from the student’s perspective.
The elements of the 2014 initiative are discussed
third, in which eight role identities are described that
satisfy the problems expressed and address the goals
of new PME policies. These role identities were derived by examining the aforementioned problems and
the requirements and expectations of senior leaders
in practice. The eight identities are divided into two
sets. Persistent role identities are expected of senior
leaders on a 24/7 basis and are: steward of the profession, critical and reflective thinker, networked leader,
and resilient leader. Mission-specific role identities are driven more by specific duties and requirements: strategic advisor and communicator, strategic
theorist, strategic planner, and senior leader at the
strategic level.
xiii

Fourth, recommendations are given for furthering
the initiative across an SSC program using Bloom’s
affective domain to specify a progression of developmental objectives. These include establishing separate
developmental objectives that are attainable through
both formal education and the many available nonformal education opportunities that SSC environments provide. This allows for a way to provide a
well-rounded development environment that goes
beyond the classroom setting.
This Letort Paper concludes with further recommendations on how this curricular model could be generalized across both officer and civilian professional
development programs.
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ENHANCING IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT AT
SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES
INTRODUCTION
Army senior Professional Military Education
(PME) includes the Senior Service College (SSC) resident and distance programs along with fellowships at
universities and agencies within the United States and
abroad. SSCs are responsible for aiding in the transition of officers from the mid-level to the senior levels
of command, leadership, and management. As the
saying goes, “Colonels run the Army.” The transition
is significant; in addition to scaling up the technical
expertise and know-how to get things done within
higher-level commands and staff headquarters, senior
leaders also assume guardianship of the Army profession, which includes both greater personal and professional responsibilities, and greater scrutiny over
their actions and decisions by those inside and outside
the Service.
In addition to gaining skills and acquiring knowledge, moving from mid-career to senior leader requires a transition of one’s professional identity. The
transition involves the letting go of one’s mid-career
persona and adoption of a new persona, encapsulating values and dispositions expected of senior leaders
to be able to operate in, and cope with, the strategic
environment. It constitutes a personal journey from
one level of leadership to another, and results in one’s
ability to apply such skills and knowledge in future
situations. It is also not an optional journey, as the failure to adopt and internalize those higher-order values
and dispositions are directly linked to various destruc-
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tive and unethical behaviors that the joint community
wishes to avoid.
Unfortunately, identity development gets short
shrift in PME in general and SSCs in particular. The
inculcation of professional values, resiliency, and
critical and reflective thought are essential to properly
operationalizing the skills and knowledge learned in
SSC; but these are all-around highly subjective, difficult to measure, and therefore difficult to develop
educational activities. New policies for officer and
civilian professional education include provisions
for developing leaders, such as the recent inclusion
of six Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs) in the 2015
E version of the Joint instruction, Officer Professional
Military Education Policy (OPMEP), but it remains unclear how to operationalize those goals in curriculum
development.
A 2014 initiative at the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC) offers a potential model. A presentation of
eight “role identities”1 as a descriptive tool to help SSC
students understand how their PME would be applied
in their future duties as senior leaders was included
early in the USAWC curriculum. Short narratives of
these role identities have helped orient students on the
transitions they are expected to undertake and how
they might cope with the strategic environment they
are about to enter. Through the role identity metaphor,
the goal was to situate the students in the positions of
current and past senior leaders, helping them better
appreciate the decisions and activities those leaders
undertook so as to ease their own transitions. The initiative has had some success, but it currently does not
satisfy the overall need for fully incorporating identity
development into the program.
The purpose of this Letort Paper is to examine the
overall challenges associated with identity develop2

ment and propose an expansion of the USAWC initiative for broader application across SSCs. This Letort
Paper is organized as follows: First, it defines several
avoidable problems associated with the failure to
properly develop identities among senior leaders and
presents the case for a greater inclusion of identity development in SSCs. Second, various identity-related
ideas and models are discussed from educational literature, as other professions have wrestled with similar challenges. From this emerges the construct of the
“role identity” as a viable choice for expressing the attitudes and dispositions desired in the context of the
SSC students’ future requirements as senior leaders.
The elements of the 2014 initiative are discussed third,
in which eight role identities are described that satisfy
the problems expressed and address the goals of new
PME policies. Fourth, recommendations are given for
furthering the initiative across an SSC program using Benjamin S. Bloom’s affective domain to specify a
progression of developmental objectives. This Letort
Paper concludes with further recommendations on
how this curricular model could be generalized across
both officer and civilian professional development
programs.
THE PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY
OF SENIOR LEADERS
A professional identity is described as “the perception of oneself as a professional and as a particular
type of professional,” by Rue Bucher and Joan Stelling.2 Vicki Schweitzer describes it as: “relatively stable and encompass[ing] the attributes, beliefs, values,
motives, and experiences that help individuals define
themselves in a professional role.”3 People often have
multiple identities related to the various roles they
3

perform, and they tend to use labels to describe them.4
These labels often take the form of roles such as professional or vocational (e.g., doctor, lawyer, teacher),
familial (e.g., parent, sibling, son or daughter), or as
relating to skills or hobbies (e.g., golfer, nature photographer, scouting leader). One can also perceive
oneself as not carrying a particular identity, called a
“NOT-me.”5 A military example of this relates to the
degree that some officers strive to avoid Pentagon assignments,6 telling themselves and others something
like: I am a troop leader; I am not a politician.
The Challenges of Leader Identity Development.
Individuals internalize leader identities upon
reaching the conclusion that, “Yes, I am a leader.”7
Leader identities are naturally ambiguous,8 because
there are “no objective measures or indicators of
whether one is or is not a leader.”9 Rather, the ability
to assume, and therefore internalize, a leader identity is contingent on a cycle of claiming and granting
through social interactions.10 What is claimed and
granted as one’s leader identity can correspond to
one’s leader behaviors, whether that is positive (e.g.,
transformational leadership) or negative (e.g., abusive
leadership).11
Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP)
6-22, Army Leadership, defines identity as “one’s selfconcept” and states that leaders form leader identities when they: (1) self-identify as leaders; (2) are
perceived as leaders by others; (3) are leaders in relation to others; and (4) are collectively endorsed by the
organization as leaders.12 ADRP 6-22 only refers to a
generic “leader identity” and ties it to self-awareness
and character development, but it does not specify
how identity relates to specific roles such as: com4

mander, director, supervisor, advisor, spokesperson,
crisis manager, moral exemplar, and others.13 The
doctrinal treatment is aspirational, such that acquiring a “complete” and “accurate” leader identity is sufficient for suitably enacting that identity in leadership
situations.14
There are, however, challenges in developing and
enacting leader identities. First, when organizations
prescribe identity traits (such as listed in the ADRP),15
they tend to be expressed in positive or conformist
terms based on what the organization prefers, whereas useful identity development can run counter to
such forms. One example is whistleblowing, an activity that is clearly warranted under certain conditions
but disruptive and often discouraged in practice.16 It
is easy to declare particular traits as valued and to use
the education setting as a means of reinforcing those
values. It is quite the opposite to introduce them normatively through the actual lived experience of members when in the field, as they may run counter to the
organizational culture.17
Second, identities change as roles change, especially when one’s role is significantly altered, triggering an identity transition.18 These can be triggered in
four ways: changes in the situation, conflicts among
one’s own multiple identities, conflicts between one’s
identity and behaviors, and from the results of selfverification with others.19 But the presence of the trigger does not necessarily initiate the transition. Identities are resilient and resist change, and individuals
are more likely to perceive the environment in ways
that verify one’s own self-concepts.20 Thus, while the
military may expect that its officers undergo identity
changes that parallel the assumptions of new authorities and responsibilities, this may not actually be
occurring.21
5

Third, senior officers see their identities becoming
increasingly focused. This is a by-product of changes in the salience and commitment of one’s multiple
identities. Salience regards how one’s multiple identities compete with each other, and that an identity with
a higher salience is “one that has a higher probability
of being activated across different situations.”22 As officers rise in rank, especially at the senior levels, they
tend to either shed a lot of old identities or push them
further down the salience hierarchy. Salience, however, is perishable absent commitment, which regards
the esteem or other positive feelings felt in exercising
an identity.23 Intrinsic (e.g., self-confidence) and extrinsic (e.g., prestige, honor, and recognition) rewards
serve to enhance commitment to an identity.24
For example, a newly-minted infantry officer has
numerous self-concepts drawing from any or all of
the following: commissioned officer, leader, infantry,
regimental member, tenant of a base, resident of a host
town, college alumnus, member of a family, holder of
a particular marital status (i.e., bachelor/ette, newly
married, with kids or not), member of an ethnic or
other demographic group, etc. Because they are formative, the salience hierarchy may be flat and the officer may show equal commitment to many identities.
Senior officers (especially flag levels) will still harbor
identities from a wide range of sources, but increased
responsibilities and persistent demands will pressure
them to make their “senior leader identity” consistently the most salient. Their other identities born of
demographics and assignments may still be important
to them, but their senior leader roles greatly influence
how and how often those other identities are enacted,
if at all. The salience increase alone of the senior leader
identity can make for a difficult transition for some
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officers who have progressed through a balanced
salience hierarchy of military and non-military
identities.
Failure to undergo the transition leaves individuals in environments that potentially violate their
self-concepts and risks rendering them less capable
as leaders.25 As new senior officers assume responsibilities for the defense enterprise, such violations can
be problematic for both the individual and the enterprise. Paul Oh and Dave Lewis said that “the military
services must produce leaders who are not just war
fighters, but executives possessing the managerial and
political skills necessary for success.”26 Officers who
rise to senior levels via predominantly tactical assignments may see themselves as top-notch “war fighters,”
however, they may be uncomfortable dealing with
managerial tasks or politics. As a result, these up-andcoming “senior leaders” may suddenly become less
effective, less adaptive, or less innovative. The ability
to excel at these higher levels depends on their capacities to appropriately align their identities. Some may
strike a balance and sustain their subject matter expertise, while others may transform their identities completely and leave their former selves behind. This is an
individual leader’s decision, but it is one that requires
self-awareness and the exercise of reflective thought,
because changing one’s identity, professional or
otherwise, is difficult and can be stressful.
Constructing One’s Leader Identity.
The ordinary process of identity construction, defined as explaining “how an individual self-defines
him- or herself changes in the context of organizational life”27 is cyclic and involves interplay between
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old identities and new ones. It is not a simple process
of unloading a former self: “I am no longer an X,” and
declaring “I am now a Y instead.” Rather, it is a social process in which individuals test and experiment
with new self-concepts before internalizing them.28
The process is not a comfortable one and often puts
individuals in an in-between liminal state of breaking
away from their previous selves while their new ones
are not yet formed.29 The “letting go” of a formal self
is very hard, and the uncertainty involved in transitions can drive individuals to stunt the process and
give up.30 Working through the doubt and alternativeweighing is a necessary process for allowing a new
self-definition to emerge and become internalized.31
Organizations can aid in the identity construction
process (although they can also interfere with it). The
organization can institute rites of passage, where individuals have the opportunity to deliberately forfeit
their former selves and make room for a new self.32
Formal ceremonies, developmental relationships, and
“organizational holding environments” can provide
“psychosocial safety, acceptance, and challenge, to
nudge the person along in his or her development
[that] operates away from the stresses of the everyday
work environment,” which in turn can foster transitions when individuals face a major role change.33 A
second way is to provide an image of the new identity
that individuals can adopt and tailor in a normative
fashion, rather than rely solely on prescription. They
should be representative of the significant changes
that members experience as they transfer or advance
into new roles within the organization, and provide
an environment whereby members can improve their
self-awareness and foster a transition.
The military provides identity construction opportunities in its senior PME institutions. All its pro8

grams constitute rites of passage for entry into senior
leadership positions, which (along with promotion
to colonel or equivalent) constitute visible triggering
events that the officers are on track for advancement.
They also provide dedication time for learning and
self-reflection on the skills, knowledge, and dispositions required to assume higher-level positions, along
with voluntary programs aimed at easing the transition. Again, these do not guarantee that the transitions occur. Absent a full appreciation of the contextual change of the new roles, such as the qualitative
differences in responsibilities, professional networks,
and representation of the Army, officers may fail
to cognitively distance themselves from direct and
organizational leadership.
Why Identity Construction Matters
to Senior Leaders.
Scholars have shown that the process of negotiating work identities is complex, and it is not necessarily
the case that aligning one’s self-concept closely with
the organization’s prescribed identity is beneficial to
the organization.34 Rather, completion of a transition
can put both the individual and the organization at
a disadvantage. For example, the organization may
have set unrealistic expectations on the individual, or
the work situation creates an internal conflict for the
individual35 or causes the individual to develop undesirable habits or behaviors that become internalized as
norms.36 Achieving the rank and education of senior
leadership may end one transitional episode of an officer’s career, but not the continuing process of learning
and negotiating the work identity within and between
senior leader positions thereafter.
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Four problems provided below are offered as evidence that improper identity construction has an effect on military organizational performance and readiness. They each indicate either poor construction or
subsequent deconstruction of senior leader identities.
Succumbing to Passive Compliance.
In a commentary about why many senior officers
stayed silent over the Bush administration’s approach
to the war in Iraq, giving rise to the so-called “Revolt of
the Generals,” two USAWC scholars proposed that it
was the: “prevalent ‘Can Do’ attitude and an enduring
deference to authority.”37 They said that these ideas
were implanted early in an officer’s career when the
concept of civilian authority was remote and abstract.
Even though the officer may rise to positions of granting professional military advice to civilian authorities
and likely would have developed the requisite knowledge and expertise to do so, if they have not shaped
their identities in kind, they will be more likely to
exercise deference when not fully warranted.38
A particularly important aspect of this is how the
“Can Do” attitude can both generate passive compliance and encourage officers to mask their discomfort,
especially if the officers are able to get by on their
skills and competencies alone for a while and they can
“wait out” the situation until the next assignment. The
masking serves as protection against potential embarrassment or mistakes. Chris Argyris called these
“traps” and demonstrated that they are ubiquitous in
organizations.39 As a profession, the military rightly
abhors these traps, and expects its leaders to exercise
loyalty and obedience in ways that overcome or set
aside this discomfort,40 especially in situations that
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clearly call for action. Leaders who fail to act or speak
up are thus viewed very negatively, as “careerists”41
or those shirking their responsibilities,42 so enduring
this discomfort is clearly not the preferred approach
within the Army. Argyris offers that avoiding these
“traps” involves self-awareness. Leaders recognize
that the misalignment exists, how they may be contributing to that misalignment, and that they are empowered and obligated to overcome it.
Growing Disidentification.
This is a result of the narrowing of one’s salience
hierarchy, whereby officers who are uncomfortable
with their dominant “senior leader” role find themselves routinely being reminded of who they are not.
Dr. Leonard (Bones) McCoy of Star Trek43 fame exemplified this in his catchphrase, “I’m a doctor, not a
[something else]!” When faced with that “something
else,” leaders might respond in one of two ways: (1)
the McCoy response, which amounts to avoidance, or
(2) the preferred response of engaging with the right
experts or becoming sufficiently knowledgeable in the
matter.44 Both types of response are common reactions
to entry into more complex domains, such as moving from Service-specific issues to joint, from military
matters to interagency, or from tactical to strategic, all
of which are encompassed in the promotion from the
mid-level ranks to senior leadership. The more disidentified an officer is to a role, the more likely that
poor duty performance and ethical numbness can
result.
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu spoke of
an individual habitus, a sense of identity that one carries on to new and unfamiliar situations.45 This con-
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cept would be familiar to officers whose early careers
were exclusively battalion level or below and are experiencing their first Pentagon assignment, but who
had not yet shed their tactically oriented persona.46
At the USAWC, there always seems to be a percentage of students attending the resident program who
conceive themselves as “not academically inclined”
or “not writers or researchers,” who may be active
participants in seminar dialogue, but struggle with
meeting some of the formal academic requirements.
Those who are predisposed to avoid what is outside
their expertise will be more likely to shut out or disregard important aspects of complex problems, even
if they have the skills and competencies to empathize
with alternative perspectives, that is, to engage with
the experts. It is not necessary that the leader converts
a NOT-me identity into a Me. After all, not everyone
excels in the Pentagon environment or publishes their
SSC papers in leading journals. Rather, leaders need to
exercise sufficient self-awareness to prevent the NOTme identities from becoming liabilities and sources of
myopia.
Stress and Health Problems.
Events and situations that cause individuals to
question “who they are” can be highly stressful and
negatively impact one’s physiological and psychological health.47 Along with the aforementioned stresses
associated with the transition process, senior leaders
are continuously under pressure to deal with other
identity-challenging situations, such as organizational change or transformation efforts, difficult ethical
dilemmas, and continual crises.48
The defense enterprise is constantly undergoing change or the potential for change. Some change
12

efforts are intentional and often carry a label, such as
General Eric Shinseki’s 1990s-era Army Transformation. Some are deliberate efforts driven by an internal
or external event or pattern, such as the Army’s response to the emergence of an Improvised Explosive
Device threat after IRAQI FREEDOM. Others are the
result of emergent phenomena that ultimately change
the way the Army does business, such as social media
and the dilemmas of encouraging or restricting their
use over military computer networks. Then there is
the potential for change, as evidenced in common
strategic-level inquiries and data calls for various
“what if” scenarios, such as, “What if X amount was
cut from the budget?” or “What if we cancelled this
program?” Finally, the Army often undergoes many
organizational change efforts (restructuring, downsizing, new equipment fielding, doctrine rewriting, and
so forth) at once. These can accumulate and create
stress, sometimes called change fatigue.49
It is beyond the scope of this Letort Paper to characterize the increased complexity and prevalence of
the ethical dimension of strategic decision-making
and activity. It is sufficient to note that many decisions
at the Army level weigh competing values. These can
be between the needs of the institution and those of
soldiers, civilians, and family members;50 between
the perspectives of the military and civilian authority;51 between ethical and moral choices between the
United States and its coalition partners during operations;52 or among options or courses of action in the
ethical application of landpower.53 It is taken as given
that the vast majority of senior PME students identify
themselves as “ethical and moral leaders” who, in the
words of General Montgomery Meigs, “Do what’s
right; sleep at night.”54 However, even after success-
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fully navigating the ethical dimension of a tough strategic issue, wading through the “grayness” can be inherently stressful; and should the matter persist over a
period of time, it could cause leaders to question their
commitment to their identities.55
Crisis can sometimes dominate the time and energy
expended by senior military leaders. The stakeholders
are many, the stakes are often very high, and the repercussions of mishandling a crisis can be great.56 But
crises vary in nature based on how predictable they
are and to what degree the military can influence the
situation.57 Calamities,58 embarrassments, mistakes,59
and instances of misinformation or disinformation60
can generate particularly frustrating crisis situations
and place senior leaders on the defensive against anxious external stakeholders (e.g., the recurrent issues
about sexual harassment and assault). Important for
a leader’s self-awareness and identity is the degree to
which one is emotionally or spiritually aligned to handle the nature, scope, and frequency of the crises encountered. The political nature of many strategic level
crises may not surprise, but might still jolt budding
senior leaders. Even when handled well, crises can enact emotional tolls that should not be left unresolved.61
The importance of building one’s resilience as
part of a senior leader’s identity cannot be overstated.
Among his four attributes of generalship, General
Meigs described the need for senior officers to have
energy. Such leaders “influence the battle with their
presence. The best ones have that uncanny knack
of being at the critical point at just the right time.”62
Generating that energy comes with building and sustaining a leader’s resilience.
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Ethical Failure.
At its essence, the narrowing of the senior leader’s identity salience hierarchy can be described as
potentially setting up a conflict between “I am me”
and “I represent us.” Senior leaders are “the ultimate
representatives of the organization and its cause and
purpose” and therefore assume “elevated levels of
responsibilities and visibility.”63 Most of this attention is based on the office, meaning the position and
rank held, which is temporary and conferred socially
by the organization (under the authority of the Nation). However, when the individual’s identity, the “I
am me,” improperly internalizes that responsibility
and visibility, one risks acting too much in one’s own
self-interests rather than in the best interests of the
organization.
Dean Ludwig and Clinton Longenecker described
this as the “Bathsheba Syndrome,” where successful
leaders yield to the temptations of success and subsequently take worsening actions to cover up their
misdeeds.64 In such cases, one’s senior leader identity
loses salience, leading to vulnerability to temptation.
Once succumbed, the leader must assert a new corrupted identity whose salience becomes very strong
out of fear of being caught. Destructive or “toxic”
leadership is another example of ethical failure,65 one
likely rooted in a pre-existing corrupted identity that
becomes amplified after attainment of higher rank
and authority.
Self-identification as a wholly ethical and moral
leader is necessary but insufficient. Merely being a
leader positions oneself in the line of temptation. The
pressures on senior leaders to achieve, the complexity
and fluidity of their environment, and the high expec-
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tations they place upon themselves can cause leaders
to question their commitment to their identity over
time.66 Overcoming that requires that leaders view
themselves as guardians of the morals and ethics of
the institution, showing the capacity and will to exercise coping strategies for such delicate situations.67
THE ROLE IDENTITY AS AN
EDUCATIONAL TOOL
Identity construction may be important, but incorporating it into professional education is hard to do.
There have been several efforts at framing identity as
a necessary part of advanced educational programs.
Comparing Role Identity to Other Metaphors.
Learning and development literature is replete
with models and methods for purposeful identity
construction in learners. The following presents some
common metaphors and their challenges as tools for
identity construction.
Competence and competencies. A competency is
an ability to put skills and knowledge into practice
and has been pursued as an academic outcome since
the 1970s;68 scholars have vigorously sought to operationalize it. But due to the subsequent plethora of
definitions and models, there arose many unanswered
questions and much unfinished business regarding
how competencies were defined, modeled, assessed,
and developed within individuals.69 Efforts to incorporate competencies as synthesized skills, knowledge,
and dispositions among higher education in Europe
devolved into measuring skills and knowledge only,
essentially restoring the original problem.70 Moreover,
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some literature views competencies as skills, knowledge, and behaviors, which is far less conducive to
identity construction. Although SSCs use competencies as a way of encapsulating important skills, knowledge, behaviors, and dispositions for senior leaders,71
in practice they are used to promote understanding
and do not serve as formal or informal learning outcomes from PME.
Apprenticeships. One framework of “professional
education” included three components called apprenticeships that targeted different aspects of professional
behavior. These were the intellectual apprenticeship
(of knowing), skill apprenticeship (of doing), and apprenticeship of identity and purpose (of being).72 Much
of the pedagogy involved observation and imitation of
applying knowledge and skills,73 but has been studied
mainly in entry-level professional or undergraduate
programs with a skill component.74 Broader application of this apprenticeship remains lacking, mainly because a systematic approach has yet to be developed,75
and there is a risk that the identities developed during
a PME program are merely “student identities” which
are disposed of after graduation.76
DLAs. This is the route taken by the most recent
joint PME policy, Officer Professional Military Education
Policy (OPMEP),77 and emerged as a result of extensive
study and research by the military to instill “requisite
values, strategic, and critical thinking skills to keep
pace with the [changing] strategic environment.”78 Six
DLAs were developed for military officers, and the
OPMEP mandated their inclusion in all joint-certified
officer PME curricula. However, the OPMEP was not
specific about how these would be operationalized,
leaving them as a goal of resident and distance programs. Also, the officer education continuum depicted
in the new OPMEP showed the DLAs being present
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across all levels and did not provide cues as to how
they might be differentiated at different PME levels,
such as from intermediate (mid-career) level to senior
level. Hence, they are insufficient as tools for professional identity construction.
Adding to these limitations are the natural challenges of finite time and resources. SSC resident programs operate on a fixed 10-month plan, and anything
added to the curriculum requires that something be
taken away. Administration of PME tends to emphasize formal learning and formal outcomes that can be
systematically measured and analyzed.79 This clearly
disadvantages identity construction, which is individually undertaken and difficult to incorporate as
an educational outcome. Thus remained a need for a
construct for the SSC context to efficiently aid in the
professional identity construction of senior officers.
The proposal, drawing from the USAWC resident
program, is to use the role identity as the construct.
Role identities can be a means of communicating the
institutional requirements of senior leaders, because
they describe the “expectations tied to a social position that guide people’s attitudes and behavior.”80
This metaphor has several advantages. First, role
transitions and their impacts on identity construction
have been extensively studied.81 It thus provides a
solid theoretical framework to guide the development
and usage of role identities in a PME setting.
Second, they can be used both normatively and prescriptively. They can be prescriptive by encapsulating
the skills, knowledge, behaviors, and dispositions that
the organization unequivocally demands, while being
normative in how they are employed. This provides
important degrees of freedom for individual students
to reflect on where their personal career paths will
take them.
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Third, role identities are easier to communicate
and apply within a formal educational context because they situate the students in their future roles as
senior leaders. It gives them the ability to form mental
pictures of the leaders they will become. It encourages
students to think about what it takes to operationalize
the knowledge gained at the resident program into a
range of possible settings or scenarios. They provide a
means of helping students to become more self-aware
and reflect upon any shortcomings or deficiencies they
have. They also bridge the gap between education
and experience, as the mental pictures they formed in
school are congruent with the environment they expect to enter. Even if the actual environment deviates
from the ideal (e.g., behaves more bureaucratically
than professionally), the mental picture shows the
student “what right looks like,” which the student can
apply in practice to shape the environment closer to
the ideal rather than merely subjugating to it.82
Finally, role identities can be presented early in
the program, encouraging students to construct and
pursue individualized development plans moving
forward. This encourages coaching and mentorship
from others that supplement the formal educational
outcomes, leaving the new graduate on a positive
developmental trajectory back to the field.83
The Proposed Eight Role Identities
of Senior Leaders.
There are many challenges to prescribing the right
number and set of role identities for senior leaders.
First, they should be generally salient among all members of the senior leadership, both horizontally across
functional lines and vertically from colonel to four-
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star general. Clearly, some roles will require full salience and total commitment as part of accepting a position as senior leader. But, some roles may allow for
less salience for certain leaders due to the context. One
can imagine that dominant roles would differ among
a garrison commander of a joint base, a strategic planner in a G-5, and a program executive officer for a major defense acquisition. However, given the right set
of roles, senior officers would find all of them at least
moderately salient in any context, and they would adjust salience as they moved from one role to another.
Second, they must reflect the nature of the transition to senior leadership, which represents a shift
from being members of the institution to embodying
the institution. The move from the tactical and operational context to the strategic environment is markedly different,84 and the roles senior leaders play in
representing the institution are far greater.85 Rather
than upward scaling of existing identities from one
level to the next, the move to senior leader constitutes
more of a role transformation, which requires a qualitatively different identity, one that must be developed
over time.86
Third, the roles cannot number too many or else
the salience and commitment to them might become
too diffuse to be useful. Fourth, there has to be a structure or conceptual framework from which the identities were derived; otherwise, they could fall prey to
constant redefinition based on the preferences of particular Army leaders. While these identities should
evolve over time, they should not be subject to drastic
change.
This Letort Paper proposes a framework that divides senior leader role identities two ways—four
persistent and four mission-specific. Persistent role
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identities are those that the Army expects all its senior
leaders to assume with full salience and commitment
on a 24/7 basis. Mission-specific role identities are
those that are more context-dependent. The eight role
identities are presented with the title and definition
as currently employed in the USAWC resident program,87 and a brief narrative explanation of its basis,
as well as the associated challenges facing new senior
leaders.
Four “Persistent” Identities of Senior Leaders.
The four persistent role identities are ones that
all senior leaders should internalize into their selfconcepts and sustain very high in their salience hierarchy. All four generally apply across all professions
since each operationalizes matters of character and
presence independent of the domain of expertise applied.88 In an ideal situation, mid-career leaders should
already be exhibiting these roles by virtue of their professional upbringing. The transition to senior leader
increases their magnitude and scope. Thus, senior
leaders should exhibit less variance in these identities
than for the mission-specific identities in the next section. Persistent identities also carry beyond separation
from military or federal service, and constitute a life
orientation by which senior retirees and veterans can
continue to contribute meaningfully to the profession
through advice, analysis, commentary, coaching and
mentoring, and wisdom.
Steward of the Profession: Internalize guardianship of the
military profession, the institution(s) that manage and exercise its resources and relations with society, and the communities that support them; lead by example of one’s moral
character; demonstrate interpersonal maturity.
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Don Snider summarized the purpose of serving as
a steward as follows:
Only by military effectiveness performed through
honorable service by [the military] with high levels of
trustworthiness and esprit de corps, and with members
who steward the profession’s future and self-regulate
the profession to maintain its integrity—can the Army
be a military profession that the American people
trust to support and defend the Constitution and their
rights and national interests.89

The word “trust” appears twice, and this is no accident. One is aimed internally to those serving the military profession, while the other is conferred by society,
in this case “the American people.” Being a steward,
one who exercises stewardship over the profession, is
essentially one who internalizes and operationalizes
trust. Stewards sustain the necessary self-awareness
to ensure that one’s own character and presence sustains that trust both internally to the profession and
outwardly toward society.
Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1 establishes
stewardship of the profession as a responsibility of all
Soldiers and civilians in the force; and those responsibilities include ensuring mission accomplishment and
improving the Army.90 Stewardship is a function of
performing one’s part in ensuring current and future
success. Being a steward implies direct personal responsibility for leading and guiding the institution toward that success. It requires being more than merely
moral and ethical, but a moral exemplar who conveys
an aura of morality and ethics within and outside the
organization.91 More than being an expert in military
matters, being a steward requires being the adjudicator of the Army’s professional domain of expert
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knowledge, who intuitively knows what is and is not
and what should and should not be part of that domain.92 More than being a developer of subordinates,
stewards harmonize the domain of expert knowledge with the available capabilities and capacities of
military practitioners, and serve as the engineers and
architects of the processes and systems that move
the Army into the future, regardless of whether that
future is one of growth or constraint.
This role identity combats both the issues of passive compliance and ethical failure. Stewards inherently abhor complacency, causing the domain of expertise to degrade and become irrelevant in the face
of competitors (both professions and nations) who
are more adaptive and aggressive. Loss of relevance
causes society’s trust to decay. These are natural outcomes in complex systems. Keeping them functioning
requires energy and initiative, and those who succumb to passive compliance exercise neither and risk
getting in the way of other stewards trying to do the
right thing for the profession.
At the senior levels, ethical failure means something very different than making a wrong choice. It
includes both actions and inactions that potentially
breach trust, and these take many forms: misuse of
resources, making professional choices on the basis of
personal benefit or self-interests, standing by, or failing to communicate truth to power. Senior leaders are
expected to avoid individual errors just as junior leaders, but as stewards, senior leaders also exercise the
vision to identify and correct systemic errors that are
not attributable to any individual member. Such errors may include decisions made through inefficient,
overly bureaucratic, or poorly designed systems and
processes, and the inability or unwillingness to do
anything about them.
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Self-awareness is a defense against these failures. Stewards are judicious in which aspects of senior leadership are to become internalized into their
self-concepts and which are not. As a general rule,
stewards should avoid internalizing anything that is
temporary—such as their rank or grade, duty assignments, and offices. For example, new senior leaders
entering large staff organizations must fight against
being channeled into confined roles, discouraging
their initiative. Top senior leaders must fight against
being shielded by their direct reports and immediate
contacts from what is going on within their organizations or in the environment.
Critical and Reflective Thinker: Discriminate relevant
questions and identity problems; evaluate strategic options;
challenge assumptions; learn continuously.
While the mission-specific identities address how
senior leaders apply their expert knowledge, this persistent role identity causes them to continuously develop and apply it. It incorporates various thinking skills
(e.g., creative, critical, systems) with environmental
scanning, ethical reasoning, historical understanding,
and cultural awareness that leaders draw upon to engage with the environment.93 Being a critical thinker
(which is different from exercising the skill of critical
thinking94) is one who is judicious in exercising these
skills and capabilities and avoids guessing or fabrication. Being a reflective thinker (which is different
from exercising the skill of reflection95) is one who is
continuously exercising critical thinking on oneself,
to have a better understanding of one’s own personal
and professional knowledge and heuristics in pursuit
of better decision-making and communicating.
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Moreover, it balances two (sometimes competing)
approaches to making decisions and reasoning—the
scientific approach and professional judgment. The
way of science cuts through the complexity of the strategic environment, developing logic and rules derived
empirically through inductive (collecting evidence to
derive general observations) and deductive (apply
the observations toward specific events or conditions)
reasoning. But science has limitations and depends on
the validity and trustworthiness of the model used to
understand a real world situation. Judgment develops logic and rules differently, through diagnostic
(or abductive reasoning, e.g., What is the best explanation for the current condition?) and prognostic (or
forecasting, e.g., What is the range of probable or possible outcomes of the current condition?) questions.
Judgment has its limits as well due to its subjectivity,
which may constrain the leader’s ability to convince
others of a course of action. Strategic decision-making
within the defense enterprise involves both evidential
understanding and intuitive sense making,96 and being a critical and reflective thinker arms leaders with
the ability to strike a balance between science and professional judgment to strengthen one’s arguments in
favor of a course of action or in rendering advice to a
national leader.
Networked Leader: Display and influence a network of
contacts among U.S. (military and civilian) and international peers for cooperation in pursuing national security
objectives.
Professions have communities of professionals,
and these communities are active and engaged. Despite being globally distributed and sometimes work-

25

ing on professional matters independently, senior
leaders are oriented outward—helping others solve
their problems or garnering assistance to solve their
own. As critical and reflective thinkers, senior leaders
think and write; but as networked leaders, they share.
There may be national secrets and matters of classification to protect sensitive information, but at its
essence professionals do keep secrets. Once a lesson
learned, theory, best practice, new idea, or anything
that furthers the domain of expert knowledge is made
available, then senior leaders have the additional responsibility to provide opportunities to make such
knowledge available and foster connections among
professionals.
Given the continuous rotation of senior leaders
among duty assignments and the global distribution
of leaders working in the same subfields (e.g., the
“3” community of operations, the “5” community of
plans), sustaining such networks is vital to ensure the
continuity of strategies, plans, and programs. Senior
leaders should remain mindful of their actions and
decisions from past assignments, so that their successors can reach out to them as resources to solve novel
problems. Senior leaders should strive to become the
masters of a particularly important (and hopefully
personally interesting) area of expertise and render
themselves continuously available to share, and thereby further develop, that expertise. Addressing complex strategic issues requires having quality contacts
across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and/
or multinational levels. It requires empathy and trust
to incorporate such diverse perspectives and synthesize them into useful solutions and recommendations
for Army leaders. Leaders must carry a propensity
toward cultivating and sustaining such networks,
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and resist the temptation to cull or prune it, for access to key subject matter expertise cannot always be
predicted.
Resilient Leader: Practice the ability of self and family to
manage adversity; sustain physical and emotional health;
internalize the military’s values; thrive in strategic-level
assignments.
This role identity is largely about presence. Because
adversity is a regular feature of the strategic environment, senior leaders must have the will and capacity
to handle it. But, what constitutes having the will and
capacity? Resilience is both a skill and a disposition,
defined as “the developable capacity to rebound or
bounce back from adversity, conflict, failure or even
positive events, progress, and increased responsibility.”97 The field of “positive psychology,” for example,
has been interested in developing interventions to
proactively build resiliency within military members
to learn how to better rebound against adversity, as
opposed to traditional clinical psychology, which responds to psychologically traumatic events.98 SSCs
have been leveraging research and best practices from
this arena99 to help senior leaders develop this skill,
which involves a combination of self-awareness of
one’s pre-existing resilient qualities and expanding
their capabilities for application in the strategic environment.100
A great challenge for senior leaders is knowing
one’s limits. Many senior leaders work long hours
both because there is much work to do and because
they are depended on so much by others, but this only
begins the demands they face. Senior leaders, especially those in leadership positions over geographi-
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cally distributed elements, can expect to undergo a
great deal of travel, which consumes time and creates
stress. Senior leaders also often need to be reachable
on short notice for crisis situations, high-level meetings, and even social occasions to represent the command or organization. Being at such a constant state
of personal readiness and responsiveness is fatiguing
for senior leaders and their families.
Senior leaders also must understand how they impact others. There is a fine line between dedication and
workaholism, or other work-life problems. The former
is indicative of a healthy devotion to duty whereby
one’s physical, mental, and emotional capacities allow for the prosecution of one’s duties. The latter can
be dangerous, as exceeding one’s capacities can lead
to mistakes and omissions, causing increased stress
and reduced morale among others. Moreover, senior
leaders who expect too much of themselves create unhealthy and possibly toxic command climates, driving
peers and subordinates into the ground unnecessarily.
Four “Mission-Specific” Identities of Senior
Leaders.
The mission-specific role identities represent those
whose salience and commitment can change depending on particular mission or duty requirements. They
also tend to involve the specific application of the
domain of expert knowledge associated with the military profession. All four are at least partly dependent
on the four persistent role identities. They are also
qualitatively differentiated from mid-level leadership;
this is indicated by the use of “strategic” in all their
monikers. Organizational-level leaders may have
internalized analogous role identities through their
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mid-careers, but entry into “strategic” leadership necessitates a transformation. Merely expanding scope,
as was the case with the persistent identities, is generally insufficient to excel as a senior leader.
Strategic Advisor and Communicator: Provide credible
and informed advice to senior military and civilian leaders;
synthesize expertise and experience; communicate courageously and speak “truth to power.”
Strategic advisors are courageous communicators101 who provide credible and informed advice to
senior military and civilian leaders.102 Professional
judgment in matters of advice and communication
stem from a full understanding of the environment
through scanning, cultural awareness, ethical reasoning, and understanding the implications of the advice
given or communications made.103 This role identity
differentiates from organizational leadership in two
important ways—the handling of expert knowledge
and the audience. Organizational leaders are more
likely to render advice on their relatively narrow
areas of expertise to senior leaders or other internal
audiences, and are generally given carefully-scoped
authorities when dealing with external audiences.
These communications are made simpler through the
use of cultural protocols that help mid-career officers
(e.g., action officers or unit staff officers) package their
analysis and recommendations for quicker generation
and easier consumption.
As senior leaders progress, these constraints dissipate while the responsibilities increase. Senior leaders
are expected to become more generalist in their orientation, and to be capable of providing advice regarding all aspects of the domain of expert knowledge.

29

Their audiences become increasingly external, especially with the political leadership of the government
and key stakeholders such as defense industry leaders. This presents political empathy as an important
qualitative difference from organizational leadership.
Senior leaders must empathize with the perspectives
of these external audiences to render advice that is accurate, timely, and useful for decision-making while
not conveying any sense of political or personal bias
or inconsistencies across audiences.
Strategic Theorist: Internalize the history of warfare, develop strategic concepts and theories, and integrate them
with the elements of national power.
Some senior leaders tend to unnecessarily view
the role of a theorist through a NOT-me lens, such as
“I am not the equivalent of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu,
therefore I do not see myself as a theorist.”104 However, acting as a strategic theorist is a common yet
unrecognized aspect of being a senior leader. It is how
critical and reflective thinking is operationalized to
drive organizational change, to innovate, and to ultimately out-maneuver and defeat an adaptive enemy.
“Theorist” is short-hand for “artist, architect, and
engineer.” The artist in the senior leader creates—they
connect lessons learned from current and historical
events and apply vision, wisdom, and creativity to
craft imaginative ideas and construct narratives that
communicate those ideas. The architect in the senior
leader renders such ideas into concepts that can be
presented as blueprints of feasible, suitable, and acceptable solutions. The engineer in the senior leader
translates the blueprints into intent and structure
for the solution that provides the requisite detail to
develop strategies, plans, and programs. The particu30

lar duty assignment and responsibilities of the senior
leader will influence the exercise of artist, architect,
or engineering roles enacted. In all three sub-roles,
strategic theorists recognize time as a factor, and that
good solutions from last year may have to be reconsidered today.
Doctrine is one important area where strategic theorists make clear contributions. Organizational leaders are more likely to employ and suggest changes to
doctrine as written, but senior leaders critique and
write it so that it can be broadly applied across the
joint force as needed. The same skills, knowledge, and
values apply to a specific context, such as combatant
commands or coalitions, where doctrine may require
significant adaptation to be useful.
Strategic Planner: Practice the design, development, and
execution of strategic plans; employ force and other dimensions of power; unify military and non-military activities;
apply ends, ways, and means.
Strategic planners exercise strategic planning, “the
process of determining the long-term vision and goals
of an enterprise and how to fulfill them.”105 In the military, such planners design, develop, and execute strategic plans in support of national security objectives.
They are masters of change—determining and codifying approaches toward ends, ways, and means to reframe the institution’s strategic direction, restructure
it, revitalize it, and renew its human capital.106 Strategic planners operationalize strategic theories, translating doctrine and concepts into actions that unit-level
organizations can execute effectively and efficiently.
As different from other levels of planning, strategic
planning is anticipatory.107 Strategic planners display
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propensities for securing and sustaining the long view
and resisting (or at least mitigating) environmental
pressures toward satisfying only short-term exigencies. They avoid myopia and operate comfortably
across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational levels.108 They are unbothered by complexity. They adapt systems, and acknowledge and
address the political dimension of military operations
without compromising the principles of campaign
planning. Salience and commitment depend upon
the degree of direct exposure to planning efforts, either as a planning team member or a supervisor of a
planning effort.
Senior Leader at the Strategic Level: Provide strategic vision and direction to guide organizational climate, culture,
and change; bear responsibility and risk for what the respective organization does or does not do; coach, teach, and
mentor others.
All leaders bear responsibilities toward their assigned organizations, but the organizational environments that senior leaders face is vastly different from
the unit-level organizations where most mid-career officers had previously been assigned. Combatant commands, service components, major service commands,
the Joint and Service Staffs, and other organizations
to which senior leaders will be assigned are highly
diverse organizations. They comprise a balanced mix
of active and reserve component service members, senior civilians, and contracted civilians. They integrate
and interoperate across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment to connect national security policies with strategies, plans,
and programs. They are heterogeneous, especially the
combatant commands whose organizational structure
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and manning levels differ greatly according to national security interests and partnership requirements in
their geographic or functional areas of responsibility.
Most matters of leading organizations—climate,
culture, change, learning, developing people, etc.—
are familiar to mid-career officers, but senior leaders employ more indirect than direct means. Global
teleconferences among communities of practice are
commonplace. Commanders and directors spend
only limited face-to-face time with their charges, and
instead rely on remote or virtual supervision or the occasional “All-Hands” events to get everyone together.
Otherwise, they are absorbed by the demands of external stakeholders. New senior leaders serving as division chiefs or other equivalent positions exercise team
leadership in “counsels of colonels” (as they are called
in the Army), crisis action teams, working groups, or
planning teams, often including or connected with
non-military entities such as Department of State representatives, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Homeland Security, and
many others.
The challenge for new senior leaders is to become
players in this different environment and not spectators. They must transcend the narrow scope of their
duty assignments, not allowing them to squelch initiative or curtail communication. They need to collaborate, negotiate, and get involved in order to break
through (the inevitable) deadlocks between diverse
perspectives to solve problems. And they never view
“their” problem in isolation. The top senior leaders
set the example for their active and decisive professional staff environment through their open, transparent, and active engagement with Congress, civilian
national leaders, multinational partners, and others.

33

The most difficult challenge in sustaining the long
view concerns both accomplishing the mission and
developing people. This is often inhibited by the demands of the bureaucracy and the constant short-term
exigencies of the strategic environment. Senior leaders
recognize what they can and cannot control, but they
do everything they can to avoid inflicting the same
“jerk-around” reactivity upon their own organizations. They leverage the talent available to judiciously
accomplish the mission, giving well-conceived and
well-communicated tasks that avoid wasted effort.
They also afford them room to grow, learn, and reflect
to become better junior and mid-career leaders.
Summary.
The role identity serves as a useful metaphor for
guiding the transition of leaders from mid-career to
senior leader. These role identities should avoid devolving into a mere repackaging of skills and knowledge the way the competency construct has. They also
rely more on self-reflection and self-assessment than
the apprenticeship model, which is designed for entry-level professionals and rely heavily on expensive
mentors. The new DLA model in the joint PME policy
will be addressed in the next section regarding role
identities across the PME continuum.
Thus far, the role identities have only been used
in introductory courses at the USAWC resident program over 2 academic years. This past year, the new
Introduction to Strategic Studies course used them as
the basis for the students’ initial writing assignment:
a reflection paper on how the case study of the Persian Gulf War from a strategic perspective illuminated key areas that students needed to develop during
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their resident program year. They had to choose two
of the four mission-specific role identities to structure
this self-reflection exercise. Initial informal feedback
from the faculty was favorable: that the assignment
was constructive for the students’ individual learning plans. However, the true value will not be known
until much later in the academic year, and possibly,
not until after they have returned to the field and performed senior leader duties.
OPERATIONALIZING ROLE IDENTITIES
IN SSC CURRICULA
This section addresses the how of incorporating
role identities into a curriculum, and provides recommendations for curriculum developers.
Setting Identity Construction Objectives Using
Bloom’s Affective Domain.
One cannot use the same learning objective paradigm to express identity development outcomes as for
skill and knowledge acquisition. One might provide
formally scheduled opportunities for students to get
together and “network,” ostensibly to improve the
development of networked leaders, but that does not
ensure that students will become networked leaders.
It remains up to the student to determine, through
self-awareness and self-reflection, what each of the
eight role-identities mean and how they coalesce into
a personal whole that can be expressed in one’s Individual Learning Plan or Individual Development
Plan. Attempting to foist activities with prescriptive
outcomes onto a normative process, such as role identity construction, risks confusion and frustration for
students.
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In a related study in business education settings,
two business scholars found that values and ethics in
business curricula suffered for several reasons, three
of which are informative for PME.109 First, identity
construction is treated as self-evident and obvious in
the context of the coursework. In this view, teaching
about stewardship will suffice to cause students to
internalize being a steward. Second, educational activities outside of ordinary coursework are justified
solely in terms of reinforcing coursework, rather than
on their own merits. Third is a bias toward “scientific
objectivity,”110 which is consistent with the findings of
professional military educators who lament a culture
oriented on system analysis.111
The method of operationalizing the role identities
offered in this Letort Paper addresses these challenges.
It avoids setting identity construction objectives per
event. Instead, it sets broader objectives at significant
milestones in the curriculum, such that the developmental effect is continuous and cumulative. This can
be accomplished using the affective domain of Benjamin Bloom’s taxonomy as its foundation.
The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives by Bloom
and his colleagues divided educational objectives
into two domains—cognitive and affective—listed
below:112
• Cognitive—Knowledge, Comprehension, Application, Analysis, Synthesis, and Evaluation
• Affective—Receiving, Responding, Valuing,
Organizing, Characterizing [reframed presently as “internalizing”]113
The affective domain represents objectives modeling variance in emotional development through an
educational setting, “from simple attention to selected
phenomena to complex but internally consistent qual36

ities of character and conscience.” When originally
written in 1964, the taxonomy was prepared such that
each level in the affective domain was connected to
a level in the cognitive domain—for example, at the
lowest level, the presentation of knowledge required
the student’s willingness and readiness to receive it.114
Comprehension was linked to responding, representing the student’s emotional appreciation of the values
presented; and application was linked to valuing,
accepting and committing to the newly provided values.115 Thus at the lower levels of both domains, the
approach reflected a one-on-one correspondence between a skill and item of knowledge acquired in the
cognitive domain and inculcation of the associated
value in the affective domain.116
The higher levels of Bloom’s affective domain, organizing and characterizing, involve value systems.
Organizing a value system involves taking “disparate
values” and “[bringing] these into an ordered relationship with one another.”117 Characterization is so
named because the inculcation of this value system
tends to be “[internally] consistent” to the student and
“characterize[s] the individual completely.”118 One
scholar summarized the applicability of the domain
as follows:
Its connection with ethical motivation and attitudinal
development makes it worthy of further research. . . .
The continuum begins with passive compliance. The
middle range expands to satisfaction with personal
beliefs. The highest level results in the consistent practice of an autonomous systematic philosophy of life.119

Recent studies by professional educators in several
disciplines have taken interest in employing Bloom’s
affective domain as a means of managing affective
outcomes at a program level, such as teaching busi37

ness ethics,120 inculcating service as an outcome of
the business education experience,121 and improving
patient care among nursing students.122 These studies
showed that the affective domain could be effectively
used to establish educational objectives representing changes of identity and the “belief that outcomes
in professional practice depend on the teaching/
learning process.”123
This encourages its use as the basis of establishing
similar affective outcomes for SSC students undergoing the transition to senior leadership. Using the eight
role identities as a basis, the approach is to establish
benchmarks for students to internalize the role identities at different stages of the affective domain, from
receiving them during indoctrination through the
demonstration of having internalized them at graduation and in their return to the field. The following is a
description of how this would be done using the current USAWC’s resident curriculum as applied to U.S.
Army officers.
The communication of War College selection and
the subsequent in processing and receipt at the War
College is a point where students are receiving the
role identities in the forms of official communications
from the Army and advice from superiors and mentors. However, they generally go no further affectively
as they are either continuing to serve in their current
duty positions, or their selection is last minute and
they have limited time to internalize the meaning of
the selection.124 At the beginning of the resident program, they undergo foundational events125 that introduce them to the academic environment and nature
of being a senior leader. These events are assessed at
the comprehending level in the cognitive domain and
responding level in the affective, by which students
respond and are comfortable with discussing or writ38

ing about what being a senior leader means to them.
The development across the core courses functions
at the valuing level—as students develop the skills
and knowledge (that are associated with the building
blocks of the curriculum) with their personal development as senior leaders, they attach worth and value to
them.
Although synthesis (Bloom’s 5th level) is achieved
within the core subject areas, synthesis across them
comes in experiential activities, staff rides, senior
leader engagements, and various other activities that
take place near the end of or after the core courses.126
It is during these events that students are expected to
move beyond valuing and into organizing, whereby
they integrate the values and attitudes associated with
senior leader skills and knowledge with their preexisting professional identities.
For example, during the core courses, students
gain skills and knowledge about stewarding the profession at the senior level and then synthesize it with
other skills and knowledge relating to strategic leadership. At that point, they attach value to the meaning of being a Steward of the Profession. Later, the
curriculum requires wider synthesis of course materials across strategic leadership, national defense, military strategy, campaigning, and force management in
“CAPSTONE” exercises or other culminating events.
As an outcome of these events, students organize and
prioritize the values of being a steward with those
expressed among the other seven role identities (e.g.,
theorist, planner, senior leader, advisor/communicator, etc.) into a personal value system.
At graduation and subsequent first post-SSC assignment,127 the developmental objective is that this
new value system becomes internalized and the tran-
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sition to senior leadership is complete. Ideally, the
subsequent duty environment should reinforce the
value systems incorporated in the SSC environment
and not cause graduates to return to the behaviors and
attitudes exhibited prior to SSC attendance (unfortunately, the ideal is not always met128).
In addition to addressing individual student needs,
the developmental objectives should satisfy the goals
expressed in the OPMEP for supporting the DLA. For
example, internalizing the role of steward satisfies the
attitudinal requirements inherent in DLA No. 4, Operating in Intent through Trust, Empowerment, and Understanding; and No. 5, Making Ethical Decisions Based on
the Profession of Arms.
Recommendation 1a: Add developmental goals to the overall SSC program objectives that include the incorporation of
the eight role identities at the internalized level of Bloom’s
affective domain. The developmental goals should satisfy
the goal of incorporating the DLAs from the OPMEP into
the program.
Recommendation 1b: Add subordinate developmental goals
at key phases during the SSC program that reflect progress toward the overall developmental objectives, and that
formal curricular activities outside of the core curriculum
should orient on a developmental goal.
Leveraging Extracurricular Activities as
Developmental Opportunities.
Adding developmental outcomes adds risk. First,
there will be a tendency to want to govern developmental objectives the same way as learning objectives.
While they can be accomplished simultaneously in
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part, such as how core subject courses can spur attitudinal changes, overall they require different pedagogies—those of formal learning and non-formal learning—and SSC programs must balance both.
Despite its use of seminar learning techniques,
SSCs exercise a formal learning pedagogy. This is
learning that takes place in a formal educational setting (e.g., the SSC resident program location with its
classrooms, auditoriums, and other facilities); is intentional from the learner’s perspective; is structured in
terms of learning objectives, time, and support (e.g.,
OPMEP); and leads to certification or qualification (in
the Army, it is Military Education Level [MEL] 1).129
As an SSC, the USAWC is subject to accreditation by
both the Army and the joint community, with the OPMEP and service-specific requirements as the basis.
As a learning outcome, however, identity construction follows a non-formal learning pedagogy.130
This is learning that can occur both inside and outside
the formal education setting; is intentional from the
learner’s perspective; is structured in terms of learning objectives, time, and support (e.g., can be codified
as part of an individual development plan); yet does
not lead to certification. No institution can certify that
a non-formal learning outcome is achieved; rather it
develops over time based on the individual learner.
This is consistent with the view of Army leader doctrine that sees military education as just one developmental step, with the reinforcement (i.e., salience and
commitment) occurring through field experience.131
The challenge for an SSC is that it is organized,
structured, and resourced around formal learning.132
Its missions and activities originate from the OPMEP
and are codified in curricular guidance, syllabi, classroom activities, oral and written assignments, evalu-
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ation mechanisms, and other activities. These lead to
the institution’s abilities to rightfully and fairly confer
MEL 1 certification and, as appropriate, the Masters
of Strategic Studies degree. These are also governed
by the requirements for joint accreditation, whose satisfaction is therefore the highest priority concern for
an SSC. Meanwhile, the formal learning needs can be
readily translated into resource requirements such as
time, facilities, subject matter expertise, and staff and
faculty needs (both spaces and faces). Although efficient for budgetary and human resource management
purposes, this approach to managing PME has been
criticized for its “systems analysis” approach that
serves only skills and knowledge transfer.133 However, this approach is not sufficient for fostering identity
construction.134
In contrast, non-formal learning is opportunitybased. In addition to the SSC curriculum, non-formal
learning can occur during the process of crafting an
individual learning plan, self-directed research, voluntary attendance at lectures and conferences, extracurricular activities that foster professional networking, personal reflection, conversations or interviews
with experts or peers, and coaching, counseling, or
mentoring from others within or outside the SSC. In
effect, an SSC can provide such opportunities, but the
outcomes are not deterministic.
For example, a high-quality lecture may provide
helpful knowledge toward understanding strategic
planning, but must be supplemented with other activities, including the student’s self-reflection, to encourage commensurate identity construction as a strategic
planner with the necessary salience and commitment.
The same lecture may foster this development in different ways and at different times, some of which will
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depend on a student’s pre-existing identities. Did the
student already work in a strategic planning group or
carry the specialty of Functional Area 59 officer? If so,
the lecture may have been reinforcing. Has the student had no planning experience, never having served
in a G-5 or J-5? Development, then, may be sparsely
perceived through the lecture and indeed through the
SSC experience until the graduates find themselves
years later in billets that require planning. Another
example is the operationally oriented officer with no
Pentagon experience and for whom defense management is a foreign concept. Non-formal opportunities
can help students meld the concepts of defense management with an appreciation of the Pentagon environment via fellow students that have served there,
such that later enterprise-oriented assignments are
less mysterious or discomforting.
From a faculty perspective, particularly in the
resident SSC environment, formal and non-formal
learning opportunities compete with each other for
time and energy. In essence, SSC faculty members are
chartered with doing both,135 but are limited in their
ability to do so. Faculty members coach their students
as part of an individual development process, but it is
not necessarily their primary function and competes
with other academic duties.136 Military faculty, civilian
faculty who are retired military, and “pure academics” approach these developmental responsibilities
differently, but overall student-faculty engagement
tends to prioritize coaching toward meeting the SSC’s
formal academic requirements.
From a student perspective, these learning opportunities compete as well. Deadlines for graded events
like papers, presentations, and preparation become
naturally salient and, therefore, tend to fill any avail-
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able time, imposing upon student desire to engage
in extracurricular developmental opportunities. The
casualty in this process is reflection, and becoming a
critical and reflective thinker requires both the knowledge of its importance and the internalization of its
practice in one’s identity. SSC programs should offer
opportunities for students to engage in reflection on a
routine basis so that it becomes a normalized behavior
in the future work environment. Journaling is offered
as a voluntary approach for students;137 however, it is
not presently required, and making journaling a more
formal part of the program must account for several
pitfalls.138 These can be addressed through the judicious establishment of a journaling program that balances demands on time and preserves suitable confidentiality, enhances faculty coaching and mentoring,
and fosters the desired developmental outcomes.139
Recommendation 2a: Incorporate developmental goals into
student individual learning plans, and design the plans to
encompass the students’ entire transition from mid-career
to early duty experiences.140
Recommendation 2b: Pursue the inculcation of executive
coaching into SSC.141
Recommendation 2c: Pursue the inclusion of a reflective
journaling program into SSC.
Generalizability Across SSC Programs
and PME Continuum.
To this point, the role identities have been developed and implemented solely in the context of a single SSC resident program. However, the role identity
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metaphor is broadly applicable to professional education settings and self-development in the field. These
role identities are derived based on roles enacted by
senior leaders in the field independent of their prior
career paths and independent of their status as senior
military leaders or senior civilians. Using the Army as
an example, these role identities describe what “colonels should be doing” regardless of how they got to
become colonels,142 and the same applies for GS-13s,
14s, and 15s who also attend SSCs. Although there are
differences between how military officers and civilians may enact them, the role identities do not inherently differentiate officers from civilians. A Steward
of the Profession is a steward regardless of status,
and so on.
SSC experiences come in three ways—resident,
distance, and fellowship programs. Distance programs are designed to achieve similar outcomes as
their resident counterparts, but take longer because
the students are: (1) actively serving in the military or
as civilians and therefore must complete their school
assignments outside of duty hours or, (2) are reserve
component students with civilian jobs and reserve responsibilities. Distance curricula forgo programmed
non-formal education opportunities and concentrate
on formal pedagogies. Meanwhile, fellowships have
very limited pedagogical connection to resident or distance SSCs beyond having to generally satisfy the same
OPMEP requirements.143 The services set agreements
with academic institutions, government agencies, international partners, and other external organizations
to provide suitable educational and experiential learning environments that bring diversity to the defense
enterprise, overcoming the disadvantages of bypassing formal PME and staying more tightly connected
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with peers. The normative aspects of the role identities
help harmonize the different educational experiences
the students will receive, and focuses the students on
who they must become to succeed as senior leaders.
The role identities are also generalizable between
SSC military and civilian students. Both military and
civilian leader development policies and programs exercise a continuum that governs education and experience at different levels of proficiency and responsibility. For military officers, the OPMEP governs programs
at several levels, identified as “Joint Introduction” for
pre-commissioning programs, “Joint Awareness” for
entry-level officer education, “Phase I” for intermediate officer education, “Phase II” for SSC programs, and
“CAPSTONE” for flag officer education.144 Each phase
constitutes a nexus of skills, knowledge, and dispositions reflective of both increased responsibilities in
joint matters and increased complexity and scope of
the environment. While civilians do not progress in
rank or responsibilities in the same manner as officers,
the Civilian Leader Development Continuum similarly stratifies development goals whereby civilian
leaders progress from their capabilities to “lead teams
and projects” to capabilities and capacities to “lead
the institution.”145 The continuum provides the structure for leadership development opportunities for civilians progressing from GS-12 to GS-15146 while also
accounting for civilians who laterally enter at higher
rates such as political appointees.147 Moreover, satisfying the requirements of the continuum for senior-level
civilian leaders includes senior-level PME.148
This suggests that the role identity metaphor can
be extended more broadly across the officer and civilian development continuums from entry to executive
levels. As mentioned before, the OPMEP did not pre-
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scribe how the DLAs were to be differentiated among
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I,
II, and other programs for the purposes of curriculum
development and performance metrics. Normatively,
it is possible to take the eight role identities and develop equivalents that would be appropriate for direct and organizational leadership levels for military
and civilians alike, and furthered into the executive
levels of leadership for programs such as CAPSTONE
and PINNACLE. The persistent role identities would
change in scale, while the mission-specific ones might
see greater differences in scope. Together, across each
level, it would be possible to generate a narrative description of how one’s identity should form and help
coaches, teachers, and mentors orient and develop
others more readily using non-formal educational
means throughout one’s career.
An example of how this could be done was included in the Army’s leader development strategy
of 2009, in which short narrative descriptions of the
transitions among pre-commissioning, entry-level,
junior, mid-grade, and senior-officer levels were offered, although these were intended to lay out the
“accrual of skills” in prescriptive fashion.149 These
narratives could easily have been adapted as identity
construction goals, whereby leaders would internalize the dispositions appropriate to exercise skills and
knowledge at commensurate levels of leadership.
Narratives for Stewards of the Profession, for example, would still exercise the highest end of Bloom’s affective domain for each PME level. At the entry-level,
junior officers and GS-12s would internalize a sense of
resources accountability, trust-building, and localized
civil-military relations. Intermediate-level officers and
civilians extend this narrative to include internalizing
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the building blocks of sustaining the profession, such
as its expert knowledge and enforcement of standards
and norms institution-wide. Full guardianship of the
profession, as previously described, naturally and
logically follows as the next progressive step for senior leaders. Non-formal educational activities would
thus be extended to other levels of professional military and civilian education programs as appropriate
to encourage the desired identity construction.
Recommendation 3: Develop a role-identity based continuum that orients educational and experiential learning
towards identity construction from pre-commissioning
through to senior leadership levels for military and across
equivalent levels for career civilians.150
CONCLUSION
Identity construction is a crucial part of leader
development, particularly within a profession where
a select few within a society are chartered with both
maintaining a domain of expert knowledge vital to the
security of a nation and serving as exemplars of the
highest-order of professional service. Yet, it defies the
ordinary process of skill and knowledge acquisition
found in formal education, and is difficult to operationalize across large, diverse, and distributed professional military officer and civilian communities. Identity construction is an individual journey, one that
budding senior leaders must undertake to acquire the
needed dispositions to put the skills and knowledge of
SSCs into practice and keep the military organization
acting as a professional one. Among the metaphors
available for identity construction, the role identity
metaphor seems to have the most promise, and the
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eight role identities proposed in this Letort Paper offer a useful first effort at crafting a general purpose
normative description of what any given senior leader
should internalize as they undergo the transition from
mid-career leader. It also has promise as a vehicle to
operationalize identity construction across the PME
continuum.
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